Margeret C. Sartain v. Vernon C. Sartain : Brief of Plaintiff and Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1963
Margeret C. Sartain v. Vernon C. Sartain : Brief of
Plaintiff and Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Ronald C. Barker; Attorney for Margaret C. Sartain; B. L. Dart, Jr.; Attorney for Vernon C. Sartain;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Sartain v. Sartain, No. 9952 (Utah Supreme Court, 1963).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4342
~ . 
!'t.J:vcr:srry or: ur. H 
-· ( h 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 1ff 1rHE1964 
STATE OF UTAI4AW LIBRARY 
MARGARET C, SARTAIN, 
Plaintiff 
and Fpe(t • E D 
ocT 2 4 '963 
vs. 
VERNON C, SARTAIN, --····················--···.t;h ----··c;i;~r·s~preme Court. u 
Defendant and Respondent, 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
Honorable A, H, Ellett, Judge 
Ronald c. Barker 
2870 South State 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
·Attorney for 
Margaret C.- Sartain 
B, L, Dart, Jr. 
411 American Oil Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah' 
Attorney for 
Vemnon C, Sartain 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONT£NTS 
State•ent of the Kind of Case ••••• 1 
uisposition in Lower Court •••••••• l 
kelief Sought on Appeal ••••••••••• 2 
Statement of Facts •••••••••••••••• 2 
POI4~T I 
ThL COURT ERRED IN AWARDIHG ThE 
DIVORCE TO THE DEFENDANT •••••••••• i 
POIU'I' II 
'l'lit COUrtT ERRED IN APPLYING A 
STANDARD OF CvNDUCT APPLICABLE 
TO TnL OLU SOUTH •••••••••••••••••• 1• 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD 
THE DIVORCE TO THE APPELLANT •••••• 16 
POINT IV 
TliE COURT ERRED IN REFUSllK-~ TO 
GRANT APP£LLA~T'S HOTIOM FOR A 
hEW TRIAL ••••••••••••••••••••••••••22 
Conclusion •••••••••••••••••••••••• 25 
AUTHORITILS CITED 
Crellin v. Thomas. 2-7 P.2d 26~, 
122 u. 122 ••••••••••••••••••• 22 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TAbLE uf COl-.TEli1'S (Con't) 
Doe v. Doe, -8 u. 200, 212, lSB 
P. 781 •••••••••••••••••••••••• 8 
Hyrup v. hyrur, 66 U. S80,2li5 
P.335 •••••••••••••••••••••••••7,28 
JAckson v. Jackson, 201 Oklahoma 
292, 205 P.2d 297 ••••••••••••• 20 
Jensen v. Losan City, 89 u. 3•7, 
380, 57 P.2d 708 •••••••••••••• 22 
Johnson v. Johnson, lU7 U. 147, 
153 P. ~d 426 ••••••••••••••••• 24 
Klopenstine v. Hays, 20 U. 45 1 i7 
P. 722 •••••••••••••••••••••••• 22 
McDonald v. McDonald, 253 P.2d 
2-9, 197 Or. 27& ••••••••••••••• 10 
Moore v. James, 2~1 P. 2d 221, 5 u. 
2d 91 ••••••••••••••••••••••••• 22 
Rothwell v. Rothwell, 219 Or. 221, 
347 P. 2d 63 •••••••••••••••••• 17 
Stevenson v. SteYenson, 13 u. 2d 
lS3 1 369 1 P.2d ~23 •••••••••••• 17 
Uptown Appliance ' l(epair v. Flint, 
2,9, P.2d 826, 122 u. 298 ••••• 23 
Vrontikis v. Vronti.kis, ll u. 2d 
30S 1 358 P.2d 632 ••••••••••••• 20 
TEXTS CITi.D 
12 All. St. Rep., 699 ••••••••••••••• 16 
12 LRA NS 820 •••••••••••••••••••••••16 
25 ALR l01t7 •••••••••••••••••••••••• 20 
61 ALR 1268 •••••••••••••••••••••••• 2~ 
1~3 ALR 625, 653 ••••••••••••••••••• 17 
'ALR 2d 235 ••••••••••••••••••••••• ll 
7 ALi 2d l-10 •••••••••••••••••••••• 21 
65 ALR 2d 776 •••••••••••••••••••••• 24 
17 Am. Jur. Div. i Sep., il, 198 ••• 16 
17 Am. Jur. Div. i Sep., &7, 19~ ••• 17 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABL£ OF COMT£NTS (Con't) 
17 As:.t. Jur. Div. i Sep., 1611 •••••••• - 2,. 
17 Am. Jur. Div. i Sep., '01 ••••••••• 20 
39 Am. Jur. New 1rial, 158, 16 .. , 
16~, 17~ •••••••••••••••••••••••• 23 
Sl'ATUTES ClT Ell 
30·3-1(1) UCA, 1953 •••••••••••••••••• 2' 
RULES CITED 
Rule 59 (a)(~) URCP ••••••••••••••••••22,27 
Rule 59 (a)(6) U~CP •••••••••••••••••• 22· 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN TilE SUPREME COURT OF 1'i·IE 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARGARET C. SARTAIN. ) 
Plaintiff and Appellant• ) 
vs. )No. 
VERNON C. SARTAIN. ) 
Defendant and Respoadent. ) 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OP CASE 
Complaint and countere.lai11 for 
divorce. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
9954 
The lower court dismissed plaintiff's 
complaint, awaTded defendant a divorce on 
his counterclaim on grounds of mental cruel-
ty, and denied plaintiff's motion fey a 
new trial. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff and Appellant seeks 
an order awarding her a decree of divorce 
and dismissing Defendant•llespondant•s 
complaint as a matter ef law, or fail• 
in& that. for an order remanding the 
case to the District Court to re• 
ceive newly discovered evidence or 
for a new trial. 
STATTMENT OP PACTS 
Appellant Mrs. Sa-rtain filed suit 
for divorce on grounds of mental cruelty 
aad Respoadeat counteTclaimed on the 
same arounds. The case was tried to 
the court settiaa without a jury aae 
judgment was entered in favoT of Res-
poadeat on his couaterclaim. 
In support of Appellant's claim 
for divorce evideace was adduced as 
·2-
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acts, omissions and misconduct by 
Respondent (which are discussed in 
detail elsewhere intbis brief), includ• 
ing but not limited to Respondent's 
habitual, violent and unaovernable 
te•peT and his use of foul and abu-sive 
laaguage toward Appellent in the pres• 
ence of the ainor children (see pages 
12·16·26·28), his wTongful ace.usati011s 
of unchastity by Appellent (see pages 
10•17-ZS-26) t his failure to keep his 
person clean and free from odors (see 
pages 10•11·13·17·2S•26). his t;eatAis• 
sion of various acts of violence anti 
abuse against Appelle·nt, their children 
hiaself, aad Appellent•s pToperty (see 
pages 10·12-13-•17•18·19•20-25•26). 
Appelleat, Mrs. Sartain, lost 
interest in and declined t.o have sexual 
relationswith Respoadent du1'i1lg the 
last Z 1/2 months of the aariage (R.&6) 
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because of his misconduct and general 
pattern of conduct (see pages 10·12-13· 
17-18-19-20-25-26), his body odors (see 
pages 10-11-13-17-25-26) accusations of 
unchastity (see pages 10•17-25•26). 
Shortly after the trial, Appellant 
Mrs. Sartain, learned from her physician 
that her desire and ability to have sex-
ual relations aas adversely affected by 
a serious medical condition which requir-
ed immediate surgery for the removal of 
her female organs. She immediately filed 
a motion for a new trial based upon this 
newly discovered evidence and by reason 
of the insufficiency of the evidence to 
support the verdict of the Court (R.43)• 
which motion was denied by the Court 
(R.l62). The Court ~pparently applied 
a standard of conduct applicable to the 
old South and Tennessee, the area where 
both the Judge and Respondent's parents 
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were raised, and where the rights of women 
were almost non-existent. (R.l51,158). 
The Court attempted to force a rec-
onciliation, however the problems were too 
basic and the parties were unable to recon-
cile. It appears that the Court felt that 
Appellent was unreasonable in her refusal 
to reconcile and awarded judgment against 
her because she did not agree with him. 
(R.l58) 
-s-
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POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING 
THE DIVORCE TO THE DEFENDANT 
The court found little grounds for 
divorce by either party (R.l56,L. 21·22) 
and attempted to force a reconciliation 
(R.lS3-155; R.l56-158). The case was 
continued for three weeks to give the 
parties an opportunity to try to work out 
a reconciliation, however the parties 
failed to reconcile and the Court awarded 
the divorce to the husband for the apparent 
reason that he felt that Appellant had 
been " ••• unreasonable, arbitrary, capri-
cious, and making no effort to agree 
with him" (R.l58, L. 10-12) in not work-
ing out a reconciliation. It appears that 
the Court decided that there should not 
be a divorce and awarded the decree against 
Appellant because the Court thought that 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Appellant should take Respondent as she 
found him, (R.l58) rather than awarding 
the divorce on the basis of the evidence 
received in the case. 
Both parties sought divorce on the 
same grounds, that of mental cruelty. 
If in fact, as the Court stated (R.l56), 
little grounds existed for divorce by 
either party, the divorce, if granted 
at all, should have been granted in favor 
of Appellant because a husband asking for 
divorce because of "great mental distress~~ 
caused by Spouse must present a much stronger 
and somewhat aggravated case in comparison 
with that required of a wife asking for 
divorce on such ground, since wife may 
be more easily made to suffer "great 
mental distress". Hyrup v. Hyrup, 
66 u. 580, 245 P. 335. The Courts 
-7-
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usually grant a wife a decree 
on the ground of cruelty on much less 
evidence than they do the husband. 
Before a decree is granted to the hus-
band on such ground, it ought to be 
a somewhat aggravate d case. Doe v. 
Doe 48 U.200, 212,158 P.781. The 
Court expressly foundthat Respondent had 
"· •• not acted in an exemplary manner. 
(R. 36, Par. 5) but attempted to excuse 
his conduct by stating that it 
" ••• appears that to a large extent 
the defendant's actions were in response 
to plaintiff's treatment of him." (R. 
36, Par. 5) This finding, coupled with 
the statement of the Court that little 
grounds existed for divorce (R.IS6) 
" • • 
clearly indicates that Respondent is guilty 
of misconduct at least as great as the 
-st-
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alleged misconduct of Appellant, how-
ever it is quite obvious from the record 
that the reverse is true and that appellants 
conduct toward Respondent were the result 
of his treatment of her. The firtdings of 
the Court with respect to the alleged 
acts done by Appellant causing Respond-
ent ". • • great mental distress. • • " 
(R. 36, Par. 7), which are the basis of 
the judgement entered, will each be discuss-
ed separately as follows: 
A. "• .REFUSAL TO HAVE SEXUAL RE-
LATIONS ••• " for several months immediate-
ly preceeding the commencement of this 
action (R. 3•, Par. 7). 
The refusal of sexual relations ex-
isted for a maximum of two and one-half 
(2 1/2) months before the filing of the 
divorce complaint (R. 142) which is not 
-9-
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a sufficietly long period to constitute 
grounds for divorce and was fully justifi-
ed, particularly where her refusal was 
provoked by the misconduct of Respon-
dent, his unfounded accusation of sexual 
relations with other men, his offensive 
body odors and his mistreatment of the 
children of the parties (discussed in de-
tail on pages 12-13-17-18-19·26 of this 
brief),McDonald v. McDonald, 253 P. 2d 249, 
197 or 275. It would indeed be unusual 
for sexual relations to continue to the 
date of separation where the causes of se-
paration were continuing acts of cruelty 
as in this case. 
It further appears that the refusal 
of sexual relations was largely the result 
of Appellant's physical condition and her 
need for surgery on her suxual organs (R. 
-10-
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43-44) and accordingly such refusal cannot 
constitute grounds for divorce. (see anno• 
tation at 4 ALR2d 235.) 
The extent of the offensive odors 
about the body of Respondent is illustra-
ted by his testimony tht on at least 
"three" occasions he bathed (R. 142) but 
that Appellant still stated that she did 
not want to have sexual relations with 
him because these isolated incidents did 
not remedy the problem. 
B. " ••• MAKING MAJOR ECONOMIC 
COMMITMENTS FOR THE FAMILY _WITHOUT 
CONSULTING THE DEFENDANT AND OBTAINING 
HIS CONSENT." (R. 36, Par. 7) 
The record shows that in each 
instance the consent of the Respondent 
was obtained before financial obligations 
were incurred, (R. 136; R. 138) particularly· 
those incurred within the last two years 
·11-
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to which period the court restricted the 
evidence, (R.l33). Respondent controlled 
the funds as shown by fact that he signed 
all checks and the bank account was in 
his name (R.93). There simply is no 
evidence to support this finding and 
accordingly it should be set aside. 
C. " ••• DEGRADING DEFENDANT IN 
CRITICIZING HIS IDEAS AND VIEWS AND MAK· 
lNG HIM AN OBJECT OF REDICULE IN THE EYES 
OF THE CHILDREN ••• "(R. 36-37, Par. 7) 
This finding is also unsupported 
by the evidence. It is doubtful if any 
thing that the Appellant could have done 
or said would have lowered the opinion of 
thechildren toward Respondent morethan 
his own act and conduct in using foul lan-
guage in their presence (R.68, 104), spit-
ing in the face of the one child (R.94, 
112-113), striking and injuring himself, 
-l2-
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(R. 65-66, 113), inviting the children 
to kill him (R. 69, 94-97, 115-118), 
damaging the stove, walls, etc. (R. 68-69, 
74, 113-115) his body odors, (R. 86, 92, 
111-112) etc. 
• 
-13-
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POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN APPLYING A STANDARIJ OF 
CONDUCT APPLICABLE TO THE OLD SOUTH. 
The court indicated that the trouble 
in this case was that Respondent had char-
acterstics common to people from Tennessee 
and that Appellant just would not accept 
him as he was (R. 158); that the Court also 
had such characteristics, including stubborn-
ness if he thought that he was right (R.lSl) 
and that he understood 'how Respondent 
reasoned. 
Respondent's corH!tlc~ should be measured 
by current conditions, standards of conduct 
and social customs common to this area, not 
by standards applicable to an area or era 
where women did not enjoy full rights and 
equality with mem. If the argument that 
Respondent sh~uld be accepted as he is were 
carried to its logical conclusion, we would 
-14-
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thereby apply a subjective test to his 
conduct and all misconduct by Respondent 
would be excused since she would have to 
accept that conduct as a part of Respond-
ent. Obviously, such a premise is absurd. 
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POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD THE 
DIVORCE TO THE APPELLANT. 
Appellant has numerous grounds for 
divorce against Respondent and is entitled 
to a divorce as a matter of law. Some off 
the grounds which exist in favor of Appel-
lant are as follows: 
A. Respondent regularly and habitu-
ally used foul and abus~ve language toward 
Appellant in the presence of the minor 
children of the parties, and exhibited a 
habitual violent and ungovernable temper 
to the extent that it rendered Appellant's 
life an oppres~ive and intolerable burden 
and made it impracticable to perform her 
marital duties. (R.l0-11, 17-18, 20-21, 
27-28, 68, 63,72,73,80, 103,104,115) 
17 Am.· Jur. Divorce & Separation 61, 198; 
Anno: 12 LRA NS 820; 12 Am. St. Rep. 699; 
-16-
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Rothwell v. Rothwell, 219 Or. 221, 347, 
P. 2d 63. 
B. Respondent wrongfully accused 
Appellant of going out with and having 
sexual relations with other mem (R.64, 
71, 80, 85,119, 120) 17 Am. Jur. Divorce 
& Separation 67, 194; 143 ALR 625, 653; 
Stevenson v. Stevenson, 13 u. 2d 153, 369 
P. 2d 923. 
C.Respondent has failed to keep his 
person clean and free of odors (R. 86,92, 
111·112) and refused to bathe regularly 
because of the cost of water (R. 86-87) 
D. Respondent has made various false 
accusations against Appellant, and has 
otherwise conducted himself in such a man-
ner as to make continua•~e of the mar~iage 
unbearable, including but not limited to 
the following: 
(I) Wakened the entire family 
at 2:30 a.m. by loud radio (R. 62) 
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(~) Accused Appellant of being 
against him (R.63) 
(3) Accused Appellant of marrying 
him for his money, although he had little 
money at any time during the marriage (R.64) 
(4) Insisted upon keeping paper 
route although poor collections left little 
money for food after bill for papers was 
paid. (R. 63, 68,84) 
{5) Refused to purchase furniture 
and household necessities and accordingly . 
it was necessary for her to take baby sit-
ting jobs to earn money to purchase such 
items (R. 89-90) 
E. Respondent has co~mitted various 
acts of abuse and violence against Appel-
lant, the children of the parties, himself 
and has damaged or destroyed Appellant's 
property, including but not limited to 
the following: 
(1) Spit in daughter's face at 
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a~ least three time (R. 94, 112-113). 
(2) Ordered daughter out of the 
house (R. 94, 113) 
(3) Struck daughter (R. 94, 113) 
(4) Struck son with chair and tel-
ephone (R. 65,98,100,117) 
(5) Handed sharp· knives to Appel-
lant and their minor children, who were 
as young as 8 years old, and asked them 
to cut his throat or to kill him (R. 20·21, 
69, 94-97, 115·1~8) 
(6") Bent Appellant's glasses and 
caused her nose to bleed, restraining her 
from going baby sitting to earn money for 
household expenses (R. 74, 75, 87, 89) 
(7) Injured himself by striking 
himself on the head with pancake turner . 
and with pan (R. 27-28, 65, 66, 113) 
(8) Broke in the front door and 
door casing to enter house in vio~ation 
of restraining order. (R. 10-11; 17-18 
• ft 
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98-99, 104-105) 
(9) Broke pan and damaged stove 
by striking stove with pan (R. 27, 69, 113, 
115) 
(10) Rammed his fist into the wall 
and thru windows in fits of anger (R. 74) 
(11) Droveknife into wall and 
broke knife in fit of anger (R. 27-28, 
68-69, 114-115) 
Some of the above mentioned acts 
occurred after the Complaint was filed, 
but evidence of said acts was properly 
admitted by the Court as a part of an 
overall pattern of conduct and indicative 
of what might happen in the future. (R.66) 
Anno: 25 ALR 1047, 61 ALR 1268, Vrontikis 
v. Vrontikis 11 u. (2d) 305, 358, P2d 
632, and to ascertain the weight and color 
to be given to the conduct alleged as a 
grounds for divorce. 17 Am. Jur. Divorce 
& Separation 401; Jackson v. Jackson, 201 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Oklahoma 292, 205 P. 2d 297, 7 ALR 
2d 1410 
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POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT 
APPELLANT'S ~tOTION FOR A NE\-~ TRIAL. 
The overwhelming weight of the 
evidence is contrary to the decision of 
the Court and a new trial should have 
been granted by reason thereof. Moore 
v. James, 297 P.2d 221, 5 u. 2d 91, Rule 
59 (a) (b), URCP. 
The motion for a new trial was filed 
also on the basis of newly discovered 
evidence as to Appellant's physical con-
dition (R. 43) which affected her desire 
and ability to have sexual relations. The 
Court should have reopened the case to 
admit such newly discovered evidence or 
granted a new trial to permit Appellant 
to present such evidence. Crellin v. 
Thomas, 247 P. 2d 264, 122 u. 122 Rule 
59 (a)(4) URCP; Klopenstine v. Hays, 20 u. 
45, 57 P. 712; Jensen v. Logan City, 89 u. 
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347, 380, 57 P. 2d 708; Uptown Appliance 
and Repair v. Flint, 249, P. 2d 826, 122 
u. 298. 
The newly discovered evidence is of 
such a nature that it could not have been 
discovered with reasonable diligence, it 
was discovered after the trial and it is 
of such a nature that it it extremely pro• 
bable that a different result would have 
been reached if said evidence had been 
presented since the Court's finding of 
cruelty (R. 36·37, Par. 7) was based pri-
marily upon Appellant's failure to submit 
to sexual relations. 39 Am. Jur. New 
Trial 158, 164, 165, 174; Crellin v. 
Thomas, 122 u. 122, 247, P. 2d 264, Uptown 
Appliance and Repair Co. v. Flint, 122 u. 
298, 249 P. 2d 826. 
The Appelant's physical condition 
amounts to impotency occurring after mar-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
raige which is not grounds for divorce. 
Johnson v. Johnson, 107 u. 147, 152 P. 2d 
426; 65 ALR 2d 776; 17 Am. Jur. Divorce 
and Separation 164; 30-3-1(1), UCA, 1953. 
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CONCLUSION 
The vile temper, acts of violence, 
wrongful accusation of unchastity and 
other unfounded accusations, unclean-
liness of body and general conduct and de-
meanor of Respondent clearly made married 
life with Respondent unbearable and 
destroyed the legitimate objects of the 
marriage. Certainly appellant's refusal 
of sexual relations during the last 2 1/2 
months of the marriage was justified in 
view of the treatment she had been re= 
ceiving from Respondent. The findings of 
the Court to the effect that Appellant 
made major economic committments with-
out consulting Respondent are untrue since 
the record clearly shows that in each in-
stance he was consulted and his permission 
obtained. The finding of the Court to the 
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to the effect that Appellant degraded the 
Respondent and made him an object of 
ridicule in the eyes of the children 
is not supported by the evidence, and 
if in fact he was so regarded by the child· 
ren, their opinions obviously resulted 
from his misconduct in their presence. 
On the other hand, numerous grounds 
for divorce exist in favor of Appellant, 
including use of vulgar language to-
ward Appellant in presence of children, 
exhibiting habitual violent and un= 
governable temper, various acts of 
violence, false accusations of un-
chastity by Appellant, uncleanliness 
about his body and various unfounded 
accusations concerning Appellant. 
The only finding made by the Court 
which could possibly support the judgment 
is the refusal of sexual relations for the 
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2 1/2 month period, however that period 
is too short to constitute cruelty 
justifying divorce, and that situation 
was a direct and proximate result of 
Appellant's physical condition. Shortly 
after the motion for a new trial on grounds 
of newly discovered evidence as to her 
physical condition was denied, Appellant 
submitted to a hysterectomy to correct 
this condition. This is the very 
type of newly discovered evidence contem-
plated by Rule 59(a)(4), URCP, and the case 
should be ordered reopened to admit this 
evidence, or a new trial should be order-
ed to permit Appellant to pro~uce this 
evidence. 
The evidence in the record is so 
overwhelming in favor of Appellant 
that the judgment of the District Court 
should be reversed and a decree of divorce 
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entered in favor of Appellant as a matter 
of law. It should be observed that the 
wife need not present as much evidence 
of great mental distress as the husband 
because the wife is more easily made 
to suffer great mental distress. ~yrup 
v. Hyrup, 66 U. 5 SO, 245 P. 335. It is 
obvious from the language used by the Re-
spondent and his violent conduct that it 
would be very difficult to cause him to 
suffer great mental distress. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Ronald c. Barker 
Attorney for Appellant 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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